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Introduction 
 
Over the past decade the living wage has emerged as a grassroots 
campaigning goal to reduce the scale and impact of in-work or working 
poverty in the UK.  A living wage campaign was launched by London Citizens 
in 2001 and is now spreading across the UK. Organisations are invited to 
secure accreditation from the UK Living Wage Foundation, and can publicise 
compliance by using the living wage logo as part of their branding. To date the 
Foundation has signed up more than 1000 living wage organisations, covering 
thousands of workers in London and the UK (Jensen and Wills, 2013). The 
campaign has won support from London Mayors (Livingstone and Johnson), 
the 2012 Olympic delivery organisation, and the Labour Party (Miliband, 
2013). 
 
Since 1999 the National Minimum Wage (NMW) has set a statutory minimum 
wage rate, irrespective of regional price differentials, and taking into account 
effects on business costs, competitiveness, prices and employment (LPC, 
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1998). The NMW has had least impact in London (Mason et al, 2006) and 
despite calls for a higher London rate (Ussher, 2013), it has not been set at a 
high enough level to stem the rise of in-work poverty in London. In 2013 there 
were 1.1 million people living in low-income families where at least one adult 
was working, a 68% increase over the previous decade (London’s Poverty 
Profile, 2014). Across the UK, there are now more poor people in work than 
are out-of-work (Lawson and Cooke, 2008). 
 
The Living Wage (LW) is a voluntary minimum rate derived to allow a worker 
to support themselves and their dependents. Unlike the NMW it covers the 
cost of food, housing and basic needs that reflect the costs of living and social 
reproduction. The London rate is calculated annually by the Greater London 
Authority (GLA), and in 2014 the London Living Wage (LLW) was £9.15, some 
41% higher than the NMW of £6.50 per hour, assuming full take up of any in-
work benefit entitlements (GLA, 2013). 
 
This article reports empirical evidence from primarily sub-contracted 
employers adopting the LLW and the benefits of this intervention as reported 
by their workers, particularly in reducing in-work poverty. Some potential 
theoretical implications of wage rate interventions in labour markets are 
initially discussed. This is followed by discussion of the research methods 
used and the comparison indicators developed. Employer ‘before and after’ 
cases studies are then used to show different implementation types, and the 
associated impacts on workers’ jobs, hours and incomes. Worker 
questionnaire responses are used to explore improvements in LLW compared 
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with non-living wage (NLW) workplaces. The evidence suggests in-work 
poverty reduction was limited, as higher wage rates did not necessarily 
translate into higher incomes for all workers, due to variations in hours of 
work, both within and between workplaces. 
 
The Potential Impacts of Wage Rate Interventions 
 
For policy makers wage rate interventions generate a number of hopes and 
fears. Advocates argue a moral case for market intervention as a way to lift 
people out of poverty, reduce the welfare bill, and provide ethical business 
benefits (LWF, 2013). In contrast, some economists warn that interventions 
may hurt small firms, squeeze profit, increase inflation, and potentially lead to 
job losses thus undermining the interests of those the intervention is designed 
to protect (Neumark and Adams, 2000).  
 
Standard economic predictions, based on the cost-minimising behavior of 
producers, suggest that by raising the price of labour the living wage can have 
both 'substitution' and 'scale' effects. Employers tend to substitute away from 
more expensive inputs by employing fewer low-skilled workers and more high-
skilled workers (or capital equipment). Scale effects may also occur as 
substitution raises the costs of production, increasing prices, reducing product 
demand, and scaling back employers’ outputs and inputs, including the 
employment of low-skilled workers. 
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In relation to the adoption of a voluntary LW rate, coverage may be small, and 
there may be a large NLW sector. Workers displaced from the LW sector may 
seek employment in the NLW sector, driving down wages leading to lower 
costs of production, lower prices and higher employment in the NLW sector. 
However, in the UK, the NMW sets a wage floor and any substantial falls in 
wage rates in the NLW sector are unlikely. Among the intended beneficiaries 
of the LW, the main winners are likely to be the low-skilled workers in the LW 
sector whose wages rise. The main losers are any workers who lose their jobs 
in the LW sector and/or those who end up working for lower wages in the 
NLW sector (Neumark and Adams, 2000).  
 
While any employment reduction will be moderated by low coverage and 
compliance, and offsets like profits reductions, other supply-side theories 
challenge this view. Under monopsony, unfulfilled vacancies at low wage 
rates may get filled at higher rates increasing employment (Manning, 2003).  
Institutionalist approaches also suggest that higher wages may motivate and 
retain staff, this will have efficiency effects, and higher productivity may offset 
higher wage rates, leaving employment levels the same or higher (Arrowsmith 
et al 2003; Akerlof and Yellen 1986). 
 
For the state, workers in employment in the LW sector might pay more tax 
and claim less welfare benefit. Those that are displaced into the NLW sector, 
or lose their jobs, might pay less tax and claim more welfare benefit. The net 
effect on tax, welfare benefits and poverty rates depends on the extent of LW 
adoption and any job displacement over time. Moreover, if demand is scaled 
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back by higher prices, or profits fall through cost absorption, any tax revenue 
from profits on employers and clients may also be reduced. 
 
Most studies evaluating the impact of the living wage are from the USA where 
many cities have passed ordinances, mandating employers to pay a locally-
determined living wage in public procurement contracts only (Luce, 2004; 
Pollin and Luce, 1998; Swarts and Vasi, 2011). These studies suggest that in 
many cases employers are expected to bear some of the higher wage costs, 
moderating impacts on public budgets (Thompson and Chapman, 2006). 
Moreover, where wage costs are passed on to clients they are often low in 
relation to the existing costs of the service (Reich et al, 2005). On the 
production side, these studies find that employers benefit from reduced staff 
turnover (Reich et al, 2005; Howes, 2005), increased worker loyalty and 
productivity (Fehr and Falk, 2002), and marginal rates of worker substitution 
of low for higher skilled workers (Fairris et al 2005, Reich et al, 2003, 2005). 
Evidence of the impacts on hours and employment are mixed with findings of 
both job expansion (Reich et al, 2005) and contraction, with modest impacts 
on poverty rates (Neumark and Adams, 2000, 2003). In addition, evidence on 
the impact of other local state minimum wages policies in the US, find small 
reductions in hours and no adverse effects on employment (Dube et al 2010; 
Reich et al 2014). 
 
In the UK research on the impact of wage increases on low paid workers 
largely relates to the NMW and its annual up ratings. The NMW has increased 
the real and relative pay of low paid workers, reduced the gender wage gap 
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and wage inequality for some 2 million workers in the UK. There has been 
little effect on employment levels and this is attributed to: employer wage 
setting where increasing wages make it easier to fill vacancies; overcoming 
labour market frictions related to job preferences (hours, travel time, 
childcare); wage off-sets via state welfare benefits; improvements in 
productivity; in-complete compliance and reductions in firms’ profits (Leonard 
et al 2013; Metcalf, 2007). There is however, some evidence of downward 
adjustments on hours rather than employment (Stewart and Swaffield, 2008), 
and, there is some evidence of adverse impacts in the residential care home 
sector and on the employment opportunities for some low paid workers 
(Arrowsmith et al 2003; Ram et al 2003; Dickens et al 2012). 
 
Under the UK voluntary adoption regime, self-selecting private and public 
organisations choose to pay the LW, and may be prepared to absorb costs 
from lower profits or increased prices to customers, with minimal expected 
adverse effects on in-house workers.  Local government can require LW 
compliance for new service contracts providing EU procurement rules are not 
breached (Ramshaw, 2013). In subcontracted client/employer relations, 
impacts on workers may be different to those in-house. Depending on the 
level of support and/or coercion from clients, some subcontracted employers 
may be more reluctant to let the GLA control their annual wage costs 
increases. Some may be expected to adjust staffing levels, non-wage costs, 
increase productivity, pass on, absorb or evade cost increases, in order to 
reduce any deleterious spillover effects on higher grade staff and profits.  
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There is an estimated 750,000 jobs in London paid below the LLW in 2013 
(GLA, 2013), an increase from 13% to 18% of all London jobs since 2005.  
While coverage is growing, it is difficult to estimate as not all firms paying the 
LLW affiliate with the Foundation, and some that do may lapse compliance. 
There are in excess of 18,800 employees in London (2%) estimated to have 
been directly affected by the campaign, and there is now a growing body of 
research considering the impact and potential for further growth of the LW in 
the UK (London Economics, 2009; Pennycook, 2012; Wills, 2004, 2008, 2009; 
Wills et al, 2009, 2010). In one study, manager opinion interviews with 11 
adopting organisations in London, found that the main impacts concerned 
recruitment and retention, improved worker morale, motivation, productivity 
and the reputational impacts of being an ethical employer. More than 80% of 
employers believed that the living wage had increased the quality of the 
service (London Economics, 2009). More recent research has focused on the 
affordability to employers of the living wage and finds wage cost rises for in-
house staff in different industrial sectors of between 1 to 6%, with the higher 
costs in the retail, food and hospitality sectors which employ larger numbers 
of low paid workers (Pennycook, 2012). In addition, higher psychological 
wellbeing has been found in LLW workplaces (Flint et al, 2013). 
 
Extending living wage coverage in London to include all low paid jobs may 
reduce welfare spending as workers secure more income from wages and 
less from the state. UK estimates suggest that if all private sector employers 
increased wages to a 2010 living wage of £7.85 in London and £7.60 outside, 
the Treasury would gain 46p in tax, National Insurance (NI) and benefit 
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savings for every £1 spent on additional earnings (IFS, 2010). Estimates for 
London that included employment scale effects, based on our own survey 
data to model changes in household income when moving from a 2011 NMW 
rate of £6.08 to the LLW rate of £8.30, found this would redistribute an 
estimated £2.2 billion a year in extra income to low paid workers. Fiscal gains 
were estimated to be £955 million a year in Exchequer savings, and for every 
£1 spent on paying low paid workers in London the living wage, the Treasury 
gained 44p in welfare benefit savings and extra tax/NI revenue (Linneker and 
Wills, 2013). Shifting the burden of low pay from tax-payers to employers thus 
has the potential to secure significant fiscal benefits for the Treasury. 
 
Research Methods 
 
The research involved a comparative case study methodology. Potential case 
study clients and sub-contracted employers who were known to have at least 
one living wage contract or to have signed up to the living wage for their staff, 
were approached to take part in the project. The research design depended 
upon being able to identify either: (1) a workplace where data could be 
collected for the year prior to the living wage being introduced in order to 
provide a pre/post case study of the same workplace or: (2) matched pairs of 
workplaces where the same employer had two contracts with similar work and 
staffing, where one was paying the LLW and the other was paying at least £1 
an hour less (NLW). Each contract was workplace specific, and with the 
exception of the Housing contract, employers were subcontractors.  With the 
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exception of the local authority Grounds contract, most jobs were in cleaning 
occupations (Table 1). 
 
The research was undertaken in 2011 and used interviews with clients and 
employers, employer contract data, and a worker questionnaire survey to 
evaluate implementation and the distribution of costs and benefits among 
agents.  
 
INSERT Table 1 
 
The impacts on employers were explored using indicator comparisons derived 
from financial and employment data from 3 employers that provided data for 7 
pre/post workplace contracts. One of these employers had 5 small pre/post 
contracts (G, H, GLN, Q and S) in the private finance sector. The derived 
indicators considered affordability, changes in wage cost, hours and 
employment, staff turnover, recruitment costs, and implications for productivity 
and profits. Contract data was obtained for the year before and after adoption 
covering client revenue/cost, wage rates and hours for different staff grades, 
staff leaving and starting, cost of recruitment and training, and sickness and 
absence. Data on non-wage costs and employer pension and NI contributions 
for staff was not available. 
 
The 7 pre/post contracts covered two years and were largely unaffected by 
changes in non-wage rate factors, such as capital equipment, material costs 
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and service levels. From interviews with clients, service standards were 
generally maintained or improved with implementation.  
 
A number of indicators were developed to explore the impact of the LLW on 
clients, employers and workers. The difference between percentage contract 
revenue change and percentage wage cost change (both expressed as a 
proportion of non-living wage contract cost) indicate how wage cost increases 
were being absorbed by the employer from profit, or were being passed on to 
clients and customers, and this had implications for absolute profit margins. 
 
The analysis tracked impacts on the lowest paid operative staff who were the 
intended beneficiaries of the LW, and excluded temporary seasonal staff, and 
staff paid higher than the LLW, such as any TUPE (1) covered workers, 
supervisors and managers who were also employed on the contracts. The 
difference between the percentage wage rate change and the percentage 
wage cost change indicates the impact on workers hours and employment 
levels. All other things being equal, if the wage rate increase is greater than 
the wage cost increase, worker hours and jobs are being reduced, and imply 
labour productivity increases with implementation. In addition, any substitution 
of low for higher skilled workers was also indicated by the percentage change 
in the proportion of operative staff hours, among all grades of staff hours 
employed on the contract. 
 
The staff turnover indicator is the percentage change in staff leaving rate.  
Leaving rates were derived as the number of staff leaving or dismissed over 
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the period (excluding retirement), expressed as a ratio of the number 
employed over the period, irrespective of hours worked per week. Staff 
turnover benefits were cost savings from reduced staff turnover, and included 
employer-costed savings in recruitment, management time, administration 
and any work clothing/uniform costs. 
 
In addition to the 7 pre/post LW contracts, medium term impacts on workers 
over a 2 to 5 year period were based on an additional core sample of 4 
comparison contract pairs. At these 8 contracts the same employer’s LW 
contract was matched to one of their NLW contracts. Contract pair selection 
was based on workers being paid at least £1 per hour less on the NLW 
contract for doing similar jobs. As much as possible, the contract pairs were 
matched by size, occupation, and client-sector in education, transport, and 
finance.  While contract differences other than LLW compliance were 
controlled for as much as possible, impacts may not necessarily be caused by 
the LLW alone in all cases. 
 
Impacts on workers were explored via questionnaire responses in all the 
workplaces, with the exception of the housing employer. In total, 416 face-to-
face interviews were conducted in client workplaces. This comprised 218 
workers in Living Wage and 198 in Non-Living Wage workplaces.  
The analysis further split LW workers into Living Wage Transition (LWT) and 
Living Wage Joiner (LWJ) workers. Living wage transition workers comprised 
those who transitioned from being in a NLW workplace to a LW workplace 
upon living wage adoption (116 respondents).  In contrast, living wage joiner 
 12  
workers were those who joined the workplace when it was already living wage 
compliant (102 respondents). Significant differences between LW and NLW 
worker profiles were explored using Chi Square tests. 
 
Only workers in living wage workplaces were asked questions relating to any 
beneficial improvements they had experienced relative to a previous NLW job.  
While this restricted exploration of NLW job benefits, logistic regression 
models were used to explore the types of workers reporting benefits (or not) 
from their LW jobs.   
 
Three benefit dimension indicators were developed from workers’ responses 
in order to capture impacts on work, family life, and finances. Improvements at 
work were captured from question scores about the impact of the living wage 
in terms of working harder; feeling happier; feeling more respected; feeling 
more valued; having more pride in the job; and being more likely to stay in the 
job. Family life improvements were captured by scoring the positive 
responses given to two questions that included: buying more goods; spending 
more time with family; sending remittances; having more leisure; and taking 
more holidays. Likewise, financial benefits questions included the ability to 
buy more goods; to save more; to send more remittances; and to use a 
different form of transport. Impacts on in-work poverty were based on the 
reported personal financial and family indicators of increased income and 
spending. 
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Impacts on Employers 
 
Overall, the move to adopt the living wage has been driven by clients who 
have made the living wage part of their procurement process. Rather 
unusually, the employer with 5 pre/post contracts had approached clients to 
advocate for LW rate increases, and this was largely successful. Most clients 
adopted for ethical reasons associated with their Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) profiles (Wills and Linneker, 2012, 2014).  
 
A number of different types of implementation strategy were identified within 
LW workplaces in the 7 pre/post contracts (Table 2). At the public sector 
Grounds case, contract revenues only rose by 1%, reflecting fixed price 
contracting, and additional wage costs (7% of the NLW contract revenue) 
were greater than increases in contract revenues. The inability to pass on full 
wage cost increases to clients, put the burden on the employer, pressurising 
the firm to absorb wage costs through redistributions of worker hours and 
reduced rates of profit (-6%).   
 
In this case jobs were expanded by 11% (from 74 to 82) for permanent 
operative staff, and wage costs (20%) increased at a higher rate than wage 
rates (18%). Total hours worked increased by 7%, and operative hours as a 
proportion of all contract worker hours increased by 1%. While total operative 
hours worked and jobs increased, this reflected declines in average hours per 
job (-3%) for workers, with more staff doing jobs with fewer hours. Despite 
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employment expansion, the LW was associated with reductions in hours per 
job, undermining total income benefits for the intended beneficiaries. 
 
The 5 small contract cases each had different implementation effects. At 
contract G, the client seemed willing to pay the LLW, as overall contract 
revenue (33%) increased by a higher rate than wage costs (0.2%), which 
could more than offset the maintenance of existing staff levels. However, staff 
numbers declined from 12 to 10, as wage costs (1%) rose at a lower rate than 
wage rates (21%) and largely remained neutral. Operative jobs and hours 
were also being substituted for higher skilled workers hours in contract 
restructuring, as the proportion of operative staff hours among all staff hours 
declined (-13%). Despite implied profit increases (33%), total operative staff 
and hours fell (-17%), and given fixed contract outputs, this suggests that 
labour productivity increases might also have been exploited with the 
reduction in staff. This is the only case to show staff turnover benefit savings 
(0.4%) being greater than the total wage cost increase (0.2%). However, this 
was being achieved at the expense of reductions in total hours and the 
number of jobs. This suggests the exploitation of productivity gains, to further 
increase profits, despite the client willingness to pay the LLW. 
 
INSERT Table 2 
  
At contract GLN the number of operative jobs (-1) and total hours declined (-
20%) as wage costs (5%) rose at a lower rate than wage rates (31%). As staff 
numbers declined from 3 to 2 persons, hours per job increased (20%) for the 
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remaining workers. This case also showed labour substitution of less low for 
more higher-skilled worker hours, as the proportion of operative staff hours to 
all staff hours fell (-8%). Despite a wage costs rise (1.5%) contract revenue 
fell (-12%), suggesting higher wage costs were being fully absorbed in lower 
profit (-14%) in this implementation.  
 
At small case Q wage rates increased at the same rate as wage costs (31%). 
For the 4 operative staff, total staff hours worked and hours per job remained 
the same. In this case the higher wage costs were being passed on to clients 
and were more than being absorbed from higher contract revenue (33%), 
adding to implied higher profit (18%). This was the only small case where 
profits were increased and jobs maintained with implementation.   
 
Overall the research found that implementation types varied from: (1) those 
where employers fully absorbed the increased costs out of profits under fixed 
price contracting; (2) those where the client fully absorbed the increased costs 
and employer profits were maintained; (3) those where employers partially 
evaded full wage cost increases through reductions in total jobs and/or hours, 
and in some cases exploited productivity gains to further increase profits, 
despite clients willingness to pay.  
 
In most cases implementation involved contract revenue increases with 
clients willing to share some, or all, of the wage cost increases. In most cases 
higher wage costs exceeded financial benefits from reduced staff turnover, 
reflecting the low cost of hiring staff. Two small contracts showed increased 
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profits with implementation, but in most cases, higher wage costs were partly 
absorbed by reductions in absolute profit. 
 
From a policy perspective some implementation strategies are more 
preferable than others. Despite the recessionary context of the research, 
there were short-term scale effects with declines in employment in 2 small 
cases, but in 5 out of the 7 pre/post cases, employment levels remained the 
same or increased. Depending on client support, some larger employers were 
able to maintain or expand jobs, while some of the smaller contracts struggled 
to do this, and this may have implications for the 68% of enterprises in 
London that are between 1-9 employees in size (ONS, 2013). 
 
Impacts on Workers  
 
As indicated in the methods section differences between LW and NLW 
workplaces were explored using Chi-square tests. All cross-sectional data 
shown in Table 3 were significant at the 95% confidence interval and above. 
NLW workers were similar to LW Transition workers, and LW Joiners were 
found to be producing most of the profile differences. 
 
All workers earned above the NMW, and living wage workplaces on average 
paid significantly higher average wage rates at £7.83 per hour compared to 
£6.35 in NLW workplaces. Given that accredited organisations have 6 months 
to implement annual LLW increments, wage rates were compared against 
entitlement at the time of interview. Higher proportions of LW Joiners (21%) 
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were paid below the rate due, compared to LW transition workers (4%), 
suggesting larger compliance slippage for recent Joiners in some LW 
workplaces. 
 
Low paid work across the London sample was mainly undertaken by foreign-
born workers (86%). African born workers were more prevalent in NLW jobs 
(58%) than LW jobs (18%). In contrast, European Union (32%) and Latin 
American (29%) born workers were much more prevalent in LW jobs (61%), 
compared to NLW jobs (15%). Latin American-born workers were particularly 
concentrated among the LW Joiners (36%). Ethnicity was similarly 
differentiated, with greater proportions of workers identifying as ethnically 
Black (59%) in NLW workplaces, than in LW workplaces (20%). In LW 
workplaces greater proportions described themselves as ethnically White 
British, White European and Latin American (70%). 
 
In the context of recent patterns of EU and Latin American in-migration to 
London, highly qualified recent migrants may have little choice than to accept 
low paid entry-level jobs, with few hours of work (McIlwaine et al 2011). The 
move to the living wage appeared to have made it easier for employers to 
attract recently arrived, higher educated workers. Living wage workplaces 
contained higher proportions of recent migrants with 61% having been in the 
UK for 5 years or less, rising to 77% among the LW Joiners. Greater 
proportions of higher educated workers were found in LW workplaces, with 
35% of LW Joiners having a university degree, with the majority of LWJ (61%) 
having been in the UK for 5 years or less. The research indicated that 
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employers were privileging access for higher qualified recent migrants, who 
were first in line in LW employers’ hiring queues bumping down less qualified, 
and possibly irregular workers (Wills et al, 2010).   
 
The research found that higher wage rates were driving processes of both 
staff retention and substitution in LW workplaces. The substitution of less for 
higher qualified workers reflected processes of labour availability and 
employer filtering, while lower rates of staff turnover and increased retention 
seemed unable to limit the extent of substitution. Over the longer-term, staff 
retention is also related to workers future career aspirations, and a greater 
proportion of Transition workers in LW workplaces (48%) planned to stay in 
their current job and move up the career ladder compared to LWJ (31%) and 
NLW (30%) workers.  
 
While having a LW job produced short-term staff turnover benefits, it did not 
necessarily produce long-term staff loyalty, as indicated by length of time with 
employer. For Transition workers, going through LW adoption seemed to 
produce medium term loyalty effects, as 63% of LWT workers had been with 
their employer between 1-3 years compared to only 28% of NLW. However, 
LW Transition workers were similar to NLW workers and had lower 
qualifications and less labour market mobility than LWJ, and more mobile 
workers may have left over the longer-run. Indeed, there was higher longer 
run loyalty in NLW workplaces where 36% of workers had been with their 
employer for over 3 years compared to LWT (30%) and LWJ (11%).  
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Most workers aspired to change job or career, with higher proportions in NLW 
workplaces (70%) and amongst LW Joiners (69%), suggesting a transient 
nature to job loyalty among more mobile LWJ workers, nearly half of whom 
had been with their employer for less than a year.   
 
Transition workers were asked about the types of changes that had occurred 
in the workplace with adoption. Overall, there were twice as many positive as 
negative responses. The positive changes were that workers now felt happier; 
there was more training/supervision; the work was more productive; and they 
did a wider range of tasks. The most frequently mentioned negative changes 
were that the work was harder; people were less happy; and more people 
were leaving. Overall, some 52% of transition workers felt more loyal towards 
their employer, and this varied from 83% at one of the smallest cleaning 
contracts, to only 38% of those on the Grounds contract. 
 
Proportions of full-time staff, working over 30 hours per week were similar in 
both workplace types (LW 56%, NLW 57%). However, there were large 
concentrations of part-time workers doing very few hours in LW workplaces, 
with 40% doing less than 16 hours per week, compared to 23% in NLW 
workplaces. These higher rates were being driven by LW Joiners (44% of 
whom were working less than 16 hours per week) and a significantly higher 
proportion of LWJ also had a second job 42% (LWT 27%, NLW 24%). 
 
INSERT Table 3 
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The concentrations of part-time workers doing very few hours reflected the 
types of firms adopting and the research case studies available. 
Concentrations of part-time jobs of up to 16 hours (43% LW, 22% NLW) were 
particularly evident in the same employer matched contracts where the LW 
workplace had a greater proportion of part-time jobs of less than 16 hours: 
74% LW to 24% NLW in large office cleaning; and 68% LW to 50% NLW in 
University cleaning.  In these cases, services were being delivered by very 
different job-hour structures in the LW contracts. 
 
In some cases the hours available may be due to the nature of the work, and 
higher wages may make it easier for employers to attract reliable workers to 
do jobs with fewer hours, helping to overcome labour market frictions related 
to the fixed costs of work, such as transport and childcare. However, in some 
cases, the LW was also associated with reductions in the numbers of jobs and 
the hours of work as employers attempted to reduce wage cost rises. In the 
short-term, both full-time job hours, and part-time jobs, were reduced with 
adoption within the Grounds, small G, and small GLN cases. Over the 
medium term employers may also be able to off-set higher wage costs by 
increased use of part-time job structures of less than 16 hrs per week, 
avoiding additional employer-NI and pension contribution costs (HMRC, 2013; 
GOV.UK 2013). Some LW adopters seemed to be facilitating higher 
concentrations of part-time jobs with few hours, and despite being LW jobs, 
income potential was low in terms of meeting workers’ overall costs. 
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Worker Benefits  
 
The living wage was found to be having a more positive impact on workplace 
experiences than on finances and family life, with 54% of workers reporting 
benefits to their working life. Other benefits were lower, with a minority (38%) 
reporting financial benefits and just a third (32%) reporting benefits to family 
life. Measures of benefit intensity showed that cumulatively 65% of workers in 
LW workplaces experienced one or more dimension of benefit, 38% reported 
two or more dimensions of benefit and 21% reported benefits in all three 
areas, work, family and finances. Some 35% of respondents experienced no 
reported benefits from the living wage. 
 
Whether certain types of LW workers were more or less likely to report 
benefits than others depended on their comparative NLW job experiences. A 
number of categorical and binary regression models were used to explore the 
influence of different socio-economic and demographic factors on workers’ 
reported experiences of beneficial improvements in LW workplaces. Similar 
significant factors emerged to those shown in Table 4. In categorical financial 
benefit models ethnicity, level of education, and second job were significant. 
In two and three benefit combination models education and aspirations were 
significant. In binary multi-dimension models, if one, two or three dimensions 
of benefit were reported the dependent indicator scored one, otherwise zero. 
Table 4 shows factors significant among LW workers in the sample, as well as 
amongst the foreign-born LW sub-group. Amongst those in LW workplaces 
the main significant factors decreasing the likelihood of experiencing benefits 
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were being UK born, having higher levels of education and self-identifying as 
ethnically black. All these worker types were less likely to report benefits from 
the living wage. Amongst foreign-born workers in LW workplaces, the main 
significant factors decreasing the likelihood of experiencing benefits were 
aspiring to change jobs or career, having higher levels of education, and self-
identifying as ethnically black. These types of workers were less likely to 
report any benefits, and seemed indifferent between LW and NLW jobs.   
 
Fewer ethnically black workers were found in living wage workplaces, and of 
those that were, they were less likely to report benefits. While there may be a 
constraint on lower qualified Black African or Caribbean workers securing 
some living wage jobs in the face of competition from more recent migrants, 
this may also represent a choice, reflecting the higher relative earnings 
potential from some NLW jobs. 
 
Gender was not statistically significant in relation to reporting benefits in LW 
workplaces. While recent male migrants had taken up jobs in occupations 
where high proportions of women are usually found, the men responded in a 
similar way to the women. However, there were gender differences, and 
women reported slightly higher LW benefits rates than men, in work life (W 
55%; M 54%), family life (W 35%; M 31%), financial benefits (W 44%; M 
36%), and they had slightly higher cumulative benefit proportions from the 
LW. 
 
INSERT Table 4 
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Workers with lower levels of education were more likely to perceive benefits 
from the living wage, perhaps reflecting a realistic assessment of their 
opportunities in the labour market. In addition, those with as-yet unfulfilled 
aspirations to change their career were less likely to report benefits from the 
living wage. While the living wage was found to have an impact on the quality 
of labour through substitution, increasing the opportunities proffered to 
European and Latin workers with higher levels of education, these workers 
may well be less likely to report benefits from the increased levels of pay. 
Employers thus face a tension in balancing the desire to recruit more qualified 
individuals while also benefiting from increased workplace morale, 
commitment and loyalty. More educated workers may well retain aspirations 
to do other kinds of work and remain less satisfied and/or committed than 
their less educated colleagues. There may be dangers in the substitution of 
one labour stream for another, and this may detract from the felt-benefits and 
wider ramifications of increasing levels of pay. 
 
Impacts on In-Work Poverty 
 
In work poverty reduction partly depends on workers securing higher incomes 
from LW jobs. Overall, average weekly net income from the present job, were 
only 13% higher at £23 in LW workplaces (£200) than NLW workplaces 
(£176). The reported impact of the living wage on reducing in-work poverty 
was limited for most of the workers affected. Some 38% of LW workers 
reported income benefits in relation to spending, saving or remitting money 
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back home. In addition, 32% reported household income benefits in relation to 
increased purchases, or more family leisure and holiday time.   
 
In precise like with like jobs hours comparisons, within and between 
workplaces, LW jobs would increase incomes. Indeed, higher incomes were 
obtainable from some full-time LW jobs in ‘between workplace’ comparisons. 
In the Transport and Small Office cases most workers were full-time in both 
LW and NLW workplaces. The majority of LW workers on the contract had 
earnings over £250 per week, while on the NLW contracts most earned less, 
securing between £125 and £250 per week. However, within the Grounds 
case, workers complained that the implementation of the living wage had 
been associated with a cut in their full-time hours, reduced overtime and the 
consolidation of the bonus payment, all of which undermined the impact of the 
LLW rate. As this worker said: “Because they cut the bonus and the hours, I 
don’t have more money than before.” Many of the workers in this case felt that 
any increase in wages was not sufficient to really change their feelings about 
their employment. Indeed, reductions in hours worked with adoption of the LW 
was more important in reporting benefits than whether the LW job had either 
full or part time hours.  
 
Furthermore, some LW jobs did not necessarily equate with higher incomes 
when compared to NLW jobs. Net incomes from LW jobs could be higher or 
lower than from NLW jobs. Higher proportions of LW workers (44% for 
Joiners) than NLW workers (34%) had incomes of less than £125 a week, 
while higher proportions LW workers (39%) than NLW (15%) workers also 
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had incomes of greater than £250 per week. Thus, in reporting income 
benefits, some LW workers may have preferred the higher incomes from 
previous NLW jobs due to the longer hours worked. In addition, welfare 
benefit reductions will have affected any income benefit reporting for some of 
the LW workers who claimed (27%). 
 
In cases like the University and Large Office cleaning pairs, the NLW contract 
was being delivered by full-time mainly African born workers earning £125-
250 and over per week, while the LW contract was being delivered by part-
time workers doing less than 16 hours per week on lower incomes of less 
than £125 per week (mainly Latin, EU and African born). Some workers 
comparing earnings between workplaces were unlikely to report benefits from 
their LW jobs since they represented overall income reductions.  
 
The large concentrations of part-time LW jobs with few hours also meant that 
many workers relied on second jobs (42% LWJ) and partner income streams 
(35% LWJ), with little change to household income from their LW job. In NLW 
workplaces higher proportions of workers were single, and the jobs had longer 
hours, often obviating the need for a second job. 
 
A number of workers at the university living wage contract – many of whom 
worked just 10 hours a week – raised this issue and one explained that: “I 
only work here 2 hours a day. It’s not enough to make a difference.”  
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Workers also remarked about the level of the living wage in relation to the 
cost of living and while wages had increased, the cost of living had increased 
faster, and workers were not able to report a significant change in their overall 
financial situation, particularly those working part-time. As this Nigerian 
graduate on the LW transport contract put it: “It is very important that if you 
work you should be able to save for the future.  But in fact, there’s no benefit 
of the living wage. It’s not enough because living in London the prices are 
very high. We need to improve our lives but we don’t get enough money to do 
this.” 
 
The research thus highlighted a number of factors constraining the impact of 
the living wage on reducing in-work poverty. First, wage cost avoidance 
through reductions in hours undermined income increases from some living 
wage jobs. Second, large concentrations of part-time LW jobs with few hours 
necessitated reliance on second jobs and partner incomes streams, also likely 
to be paid less than the living wage. If workers were paid more, but worked 
very few hours, marginal income rises from LW jobs were insufficient to move 
them out of working poverty, especially if welfare benefits were reduced. 
Third, the small size of income increases obtainable from the higher wage 
rates, and the increasing costs of living in London, also reduced real income 
changes for low paid workers. Indeed, high inflation rates had led to large real 
wage falls for many workers over the research period (LPC, 2012). 
 
The research suggests that while necessary, the LLW is not yet sufficient to 
reduce in-work poverty on a large scale, and a number of measures may be 
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required to increase its impact in future. Additional funding by clients and 
wider coverage to include a greater numbers of workers would improve 
incomes further. Though politically difficult, the research also highlighted the 
shallow bite of the LLW rate on the real incomes of low paid workers, and 
longer hours and higher wage rates are needed in future. 
 
Conclusions 
 
To date living wage job coverage remains low but is rising, and the choice to 
adopt has mostly been driven by clients for ethical reasons. Convincing clients 
of the reputational, and other benefits, is crucial under a voluntary policy 
regime. The research identified different client and employer adaptations to 
living wage implementation. In some cases clients were willing to cover 
increased wage costs, but in others, there were associated reductions in 
employer profits, and/or hours of work and employment levels. While some 
theoretical economic predictions of reductions in jobs and hours did occur 
among small employers, this was not universal and the number of jobs 
increased among larger employers, despite the recession. Most employers 
experienced short-term retention benefits from lower staff turnover although 
longer-term loyalty benefits were less clear. Given recent patterns of in 
migration to London, strong substitution effects were identified. Adopting 
employers were able to substitute lower for higher-qualified recent Latin and 
EU migrant workers. 
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Income benefits were greatest among full-time workers on the LW contracts, 
but where working hours were reduced, any income benefits were 
undermined. Some workers earned low incomes from part-time LW jobs, and 
relied on second jobs or partner incomes to support themselves and their 
families. For some workers, non-living wage jobs may have been preferable to 
living wage jobs, as the longer hours increased relative incomes. The main 
positive impacts on workers were experienced at work where ‘feel-good’ 
factors such as feeling happier, more productive and valued, and having 
greater pride were reported. Only a minority of workers reported positive 
effects on personal incomes and family life, and the living wage was no ‘magic 
bullet’ for reducing in-work poverty, since higher wage rates did not 
necessarily translate into higher incomes for all workers involved.  Indeed, 
contract monitoring may need to ensure Corporate Social Responsibility 
linked to client LW accreditation, is not obtained at the expense of 
subcontracted workers.  
 
Better implementation, less evasion, longer hours of work, wider coverage, 
and higher wage rate increases, would all improve the impact of the living 
wage on in-work poverty in future. The LW is a useful intervention amongst 
other anti-poverty policy measures, and where employers can afford to pay 
the LW, they should be encouraged to do so.  Indeed, the Treasury is a key 
beneficiary as workers secure more income from employers and less from the 
state. The evidence supports the case for voluntary adoption of the LW where 
possible, with further encouragement from government. 
 
Footnotes 
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(1) TUPE refers to the ‘Transfer of Undertakings Protection of Employment’ 
rules, which protect employees' rights when the organisation they work for 
transfers to a new employer. 
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Table 1 - Workplace Case Studies 
 
Workplace Contract NLW / LW Adoption Client Sector Type of Occupation Workforce Size Sample Size 
Three Employer Contract Pre/Post Cases     
1 - Grounds NLW 2009: LW 2010 Local Government Sub-contracted service 105 53 
2 - Housing NLW 2010: LW 2011 Housing Social In – house Estate Cleaning 40 0 
3 - Small G NLW 2010: LW 2011 Finance Sub-contracted Office cleaning 15 15 
4 - Small H NLW 2010: LW 2011 Finance Sub-contracted Office cleaning 8 6 
5 - Small GLN NLW 2010: LW 2011 Finance Sub-contracted Office cleaning 4 1 
6 - Small Q NLW 2010: LW 2011 Finance Sub-contracted Office cleaning 5 5 
7 - Small S NLW 2010: LW 2011 Finance Sub-contracted Office cleaning 7 7 
Four Employer Contract Matched Pairs     
1 - Large Office NLW Media  Sub-contracted Office cleaning 130 108 
 LW 2006 Finance Sub-contracted Office cleaning 59 35 
2 - University NLW University Sub-contracted Office cleaning 37 30 
 LW 2008 University Sub-contracted Office cleaning 45 41 
3 - Small Office NLW Finance Sub-contracted Office cleaning 11 8 
 LW 2007 Finance Sub-contracted Office cleaning 10 9 
4 - Transport NLW Transport Sub-contracted Station cleaning 400 40 
 LW 2009 Transport Sub-contracted Station cleaning 900 42 
Note: A few other worker interview cases were also included in the sample, but these employers could not provide 
financial data. NLW indicate Non-Living Wage and LW indicates Living Wage employer contract. 
 
 
Table 2 - Employer Impacts of the Living Wage 
 
Pre-Post Cases Grounds Housing Small G Small H Small G L N Small Q Small S 
        
Contract Revenue % Change 1 na 33 4 -12 33 4 
Wage Cost % NLW Contract Revenue 7 na 0.2 7.2 1.5 15.4 6.6 
Profit % Change -6 na 33 -3 -14 18 -3 
Wage Rate % Change 18 26 21 26 31 31 26 
Wage Cost % Change 20 39 1 26 5 31 26 
Staff Turnover % Change -4 -6 -45 0 -67 -50 0 
Staff Turnover Benefit % of NLW Contract Revenue 0.2 na 0.4 0 0.2 0.7 0 
Employment Change (count) 8 4 -2 0 -1 0 0 
Employment % Change 11 11 -17 0 -33 0 0 
Hours % Change (total annual) 7 11 -17 0 -20 0 0 
Hours per Job % Change (total annual) -3 0 0 0 20 0 0 
Operative hours % All Staff hours Change  (total annual) 1 na -13 0 -8 0 0 
 
Notes: The negative sign (-) denotes a decline in the indicator or a fall in cost, ‘na’  data not available.  Wage rate and 
cost change, staff turnover, employment and hours, are for the lowest paid permanent operative staff who were the 
intended beneficiaries of the LLW.  Profit % Change is, Contract Revenue (CR) % change, minus Wage Cost % NLW 
CR, showing stylized absolute profit change.  
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Table 3 – Differences between Living Wage and Non-Living Wage 
Workers 
Variable 
 
 
 
Non-Living Wage 
Workers % 
(NLW) 
 
Living Wage 
Transition 
Workers % 
( LWT) 
Living Wage 
Joiner 
Workers % 
( LWJ) 
All Living Wage 
Workers % 
(LW = LWT+LWJ) 
 
Count 
 
 
 
      
Region of Birth      
UK 9 28 6 18 56 
EU 7 33 31 32 84 
Latin 18 23 36 29 99 
African 58 15 23 18 154 
other 9 1 4 2 22 
Total 100 100 100 100 415 
      
Ethnic Group      
white 11 52 38 45 121 
latin 10 18 32 25 73 
black 59 17 23 20 160 
other 20 13 7 10 61 
Total 100 100 100 100 415 
      
Time in the UK      
up to 1 year 16 5 27 17 57 
1-5 years 27 36 50 44 122 
> 5-10 years 27 23 7 15 72 
over 10 years 31 36 16 25 98 
Total 100 100 100 100 349 
      
Highest level of education completed      
primary school 16 8 2 5 43 
secondary school 33 30 32 31 133 
advanced schooling 35 47 31 39 155 
University (under/post graduate) 13 14 35 24 78 
other 3 1 0 0 6 
Total 100 100 100 100 415 
      
Number of years with employer      
up to 1 year 36 7 45 25 124 
1-3 years 28 63 44 54 172 
>3-5 years 12 17 3 10 45 
over 5 years 24 13 8 11 70 
Total 100 100 100 100 411 
      
Aspirations      
stay & move up 30 48 31 40 145 
change job/career 70 52 69 60 266 
Total 100 100 100 100 411 
      
Do you have another job?      
yes 24 27 42 34 121 
no 76 73 58 66 293 
Total 100 100 100 100 414 
      
Total Weekly Hours      
up to 16 hours 23 37 44 40 134 
>16-30 20 4 2 3 46 
over 30 57 59 54 56 236 
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Total 100 100 100 100 416 
      
Compliance      
wage rate >= LLW due at interview 6 96 79 88 190 
wage rate < LLW due at interview 94 4 21 12 204 
Total 100 100 100 100 394 
      
Net Income Per Week Present Job £      
<125 34 33 44 38 140 
125-250 51 31 15 24 142 
> 250 15 37 41 39 106 
Total 100 100 100 100 388 
      
Have a Partner Income      
Yes 18 29 35 32 105 
No 82 71 65 68 311 
Total 100 100 100 100 416 
 
Note: Though not shown Chi-square tests between two way splits, NLW and LW (LWT+LWJ); NLW (NLW+LWT) and 
LW, and three way splits NLW, LWT, LWJ, are all significant at the 95% Confidence Interval and above in all tables 
above. Ns are given in the Total Count and relative to 416, indicate missing data. 
 
Table 4 – Workplace, Family Life, and Financial Improvements in Living 
Wage Workplaces 
 
Variables and Coding Mean All Workers  Foreign Born Workers 
  B S.E. Sig Exp(B)  B S.E. Sig Exp(B) 
Dependent           
Experience one or more dimensions of improvement 
from work, family, financial: Yes=1, No=0 0.65          
Independent           
Constant  1.74 0.82 0.03   3.93 1.14 0.00  
Sex: Male=1, Female=0 0.64 0.36 0.40 0.38 1.43  0.27 0.45 0.55 1.30 
Age: Less than 30=1, Otherwise=0 0.27 0.28 0.39 0.47 1.32  0.35 0.49 0.47 1.42 
Place of Birth: UK=1, Foreign=0 0.18 -1.93 0.74 0.01 0.15  na na na na 
Ethnicity: Black=1, Otherwise=0 0.20 -1.21 0.48 0.01 0.30  -1.18 0.55 0.03 0.31 
Time in the UK: <=5 years=1, > 5 years=0 0.60 na na na na  -0.52 0.53 0.32 0.59 
Health: Good health or better=1, Poor or fair=0 0.87 -0.07 0.51 0.90 0.94  -0.75 0.64 0.24 0.47 
Education: Higher A level+ = 1, Lower=0 0.64 -1.05 0.39 0.01 0.35  -1.16 0.49 0.02 0.31 
Family Type:           
Single No Kid =1, Otherwise=0 0.33 -0.06 0.44 0.90 0.95  -0.37 0.54 0.49 0.69 
Single With Kid =1, Otherwise =0 0.12 -0.03 0.61 0.96 0.97  0.18 0.86 0.83 1.20 
Couple With Kid=1, Otherwise=0 0.26 -0.28 0.52 0.60 0.76  -0.72 0.65 0.27 0.48 
Housing Tenure: Rent Private =1, Otherwise=0 0.65 0.05 0.39 0.91 1.05  0.20 0.52 0.69 1.23 
Claim Benefits: Yes=1, No=0 0.27 0.02 0.45 0.97 1.02  -0.49 0.61 0.43 0.62 
Civic Participation: Yes=1, No=0 0.43 -0.04 0.35 0.91 0.96  -0.57 0.45 0.21 0.56 
Weekly Hours: Full-Time >=30hrs=1, Part-Time 
<30hrs=0 0.56 0.04 0.44 0.93 1.04  -0.04 0.50 0.94 0.96 
TUPE Protection: Yes=1, No=0 0.14 0.44 0.50 0.38 1.55  1.47 0.77 0.06 4.34 
Second Job: Yes=1, No=0 0.34 0.13 0.43 0.77 1.14  -0.21 0.50 0.68 0.81 
Aspirations: change job/career=1, stay and/or move 
up=0  0.60 -0.32 0.34 0.35 0.73  -1.22 0.45 0.01 0.29 
Ground Worker: Yes=1, No=0 0.24 0.34 0.68 0.61 1.41  0.43 0.79 0.59 1.53 
           
-2 Log Likelihood  238     163    
Goodness of Fit  199     172    
N  201     159    
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Notes: Bold Sig are Significant at 95% Confidence Interval (p<0.05) and above, na = not available, Means are LW 
sample variable proportions.  B are regression coefficients, S.E. are standard errors, Exp(B) are Odds Ratios. TUPE 
protected workers had higher wages (£8.11/hr), worked fewer hours and had better employment conditions. 
